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Herder’s earliest philosophical writing, the essay fragment Versuch über das Sein, 
explores the concept of Being (Sein) in dialogue with Kant’s pre-critical Der einzig 
mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. In this often crit-
ically omitted work, Herder arrives at a number of insights that would be determina-
tive for the development of his later thought. This examination details Herder’s con-
cept of Being as the transcendent ground of predication, his contention that Being 
can never be experienced directly, and his consequent conclusion that the shape of 
philosophical inquiry should not be one of abstract speculation, but instead one of 
non-foundational, historically aware, empirical observation. This consideration then 
briefly addresses how the concept of Being informs Herder’s philosophy of science, 
history, language and religion.  
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I. A unifying idea for Herder. Increasingly, the case is made for the importance of 
Herder as a philosopher of first rank.
1
 However, the range of his production presents any 
                                                          
1 This is particularly the case for the English-speaking world. Some recent publications addressing 
Herder’s legacy have included: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Philosophical Legacies: Essays on the Thought of 
Kant, Hegel, and Their Contemporaries (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2008); 
Michael Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010); Robert Edward Norton, Herder’s Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); ‘The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 68 (2008), pp. 635-658; ‘Herder as Faust’, Goethe's Faust and Cultural Memory, ed. 
Lorna Fitzsimmons (Lanham: Lehigh University Press,  2012), pp. 49-67; Charles Taylor, ‘The Impor-
tance of Herder’ in Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, ed. Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Avishai Margalit (Chi-
cago: Chicago University Press, 1991), pp. 40-63; John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of 
Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). There has been less of a need to make the 
case in the German language, nevertheless a range of recent publications have sought to demonstrate 
Herder’s importance. A few examples include: Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur, ed. 
Martin Bollacher (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994); Herder im Spiegel der Zeiten: Verwer-
fungen der Rezeptionsgeschichte und Chancen einer Relektüre, ed. Tilman Borsche (Munich: Fink, 
2006); Herder und die Künste: Ästhetik, Kunsttheorie, Kunstgeschichte, eds. Elisabeth Décultot and 
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reader approaching his work with the difficulty of arriving at a general characterisation of 
his thought. His authorship is immense, and spans a multiplicity of fields, with the result 
that we are often presented with many versions of Herder depending on which aspect of 
his work is being focused upon: Philosophy, anthropology, theology, linguistics, histori-
cism, and so forth. The interpretative task is to locate a unifying idea that will help us to 
hold Herder’s diverse writings together, and come to an understanding of his overall aim 
as a thinker. This represents a substantive endeavour, to which this examination aspires to 
make a contribution. It will explore Herder’s very first surviving philosophical work Ver-
such über das Sein (1763), in which he offers a response to Kant’s pre-critical considera-
tion of the ontological argument as set out in Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer 
Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1762).  
In this text Kant proffered a revised version of the ontological argument. In his con-
sideration we find an early version of his rejection of Being as a predicate; one which we 
later see revised and expanded in the context of his Critical philosophy in the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (1781).2 However, what concerns us here is less Kant’s critique of the 
philosophical locus classicus, as his argument for the necessity of Being and the equation 
of this Being with God. Because Being contains the basis for all possibilities, all things 
are only possible through its function as their ground. Since the possibility of the exis-
tence of all a posteriori reality rests upon Being, Kant maintains that he can offer an a 
priori argument for the necessary existence of Being, and therefore God. Herder’s Ver-
such accepted the spirit of Kant’s exploration of Being, and its claim that Being consti-
tutes the ground of predication, but it rejected the a priorism of Kant’s elaboration. In-
stead, we find Herder developing a philosophical concept of Being (Sein) that would 
guide and shape his subsequent philosophy. Consequently, in explicating this formative 
idea, we can gain an important interpretative principle for the on going process of eluci-
dating Herder’s thought.  
This consideration will first introduce Herder’s Versuch essay, and briefly detail its 
limited reception. It will then take up Kant’s consideration of the ontological argument in 
Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund, focusing upon his development of the conception of 
Being as the ground of predication. Following this, it is possible to move on to Herder’s 
response to Kant, which accepts the idea of Being as an absolute ground, but rejects any 
speculative a priori knowledge of it. Instead, we find Herder developing a set of insights 
based upon the fact that Being can never be experienced directly, in an unconditioned 
form. From these, he arrives at the conclusion that the shape of philosophical inquiry 
should not be one of abstract speculation; rather it should proceed in a manner that is non-
                                                          
Gerhard Lauer (Heidelberg: Winter, 2013); Hans Dietrich Irmscher, Johann Gottfried Herder (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 2001); Martin Kessler, Johann Gottfried Herder, der Theologe unter den Klassikern. Das Amt 
des Generalsuperintendenten von Sachsen-Weimar (Berlin: de Greuter, 2007); Michael Maurer, Johann 
Gottfried Herder: Leben und Werk (Cologne: Böhlau, 2014). 
2 Immanuel Kant, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian (subsequently German) Aca-
demy of Sciences (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1902-), III, A592/B620-A602/B630. 
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foundational, historically aware, and empirically orientated. Finally, this examination 
turns to briefly address how the concept of Being informs Herder’s philosophy of science, 
history, language and religion.  
 
II. Kant and the idea of Being. The history of the fragmentary essay Versuch über 
das Sein is one of neglect. This text was excluded from the still–authoritative complete 
edition of Herder’s works Johann Gottfried Herder Sämtliche Werke (1877 – 1913), ed-
ited by Bernhard Suphan, probably upon the basis of its fragmentary nature.
3
 Rudolf Ha-
ym, author of the definitive two-volume biography of Herder considered it to be little 
more than a summary of Kant’s essay.
4
 The Versuch was finally published some one hun-
dred and seventy three years after it was first penned as part of a consideration titled 
‘Herder als Schüler Kants’ by Gottfried Martin, in Kant-Studien.5 The inauspicious year 
of its publication, 1936, hardly allowed it to be received in an environment conducive to 
academic reflection. Eventually, Herder’s essay finally became widely accessible in 1985, 
with the Ulrich Gaier edited edition of Johann Gottfried Herder Werke.6 Consequently, 
the work has played little role in the reception and interpretation of Herder’s thought. To 
understand Herder’s aim in the Versuch we must turn to the work to which it was re-
sponding, Kant’s pre-critical Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund. Kant’s work was written 
in answer to a question set by the Prussian Royal Academy on the topic of ‘Evidence in 
the Metaphysical Sciences.’  The paper did not win the prize; that honour went to Moses 
Mendelssohn, who commented favourably upon Kant’s effort.
7
 
Kant’s essay considers the ontological argument, and in this context takes up the 
problem of absolute Being. In opposing it, Kant makes the claim that he would later fur-
ther develop in the first Kritik, that ‘existence is not a predicate’.8 In the case of any prop-
osition concerning existence, Kant maintains that the source of one’s cognition concern-
ing an object, either in the form of sight or testimony, must be evaluated based upon its 
actual validity. Predicates, he explains, only suggest possibilities, that is, ‘no more is pos-
ited in a real thing than is posited in a merely possible thing’.
9
 This conclusion is then 
                                                          
3 Johann Gottfried Herder, Herders Sämmtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1877 – 1913). 
4 Rudolf Haym, Herder nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken dargestellt (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 
1880 – 85), I, 34. 
5 Gottfried Martin ‘Herder als Schüler Kants’, Kant-Studien, XLI (1936), 294-306. 
6 Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Gottfried Herder Werke, ed. Ulrich Gaier et al. (Frankfurt am 
Main: DKV, 1985) I, pp. 9-21. 
7 Immanuel Kant, The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God, trans. by 
Gordon Treash (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), p. 9; Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 
Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. Fritz Bamberger (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann, 1971), 5.I, pp. 602-606.  
8 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755 – 1770, ed. and trans. David Waldorf and Ralf 
Meerbote, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), p. 117; Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, II, 72. All further references to Kant these two edi-
tions. 
9 Kant, 121; II, 75.  
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applied to the ontological argument:  
If I say: ‘God is omnipotent’ all that is being thought is the logical relation between 
God and omnipotence, for the latter is a characteristic mark of the former. Nothing further 
is being posited here. Whether God is, that is to say, whether God is posited absolutely or 
exists [absolute gesetzt sei oder existiere], is not contained in the original assertion at 
all.
10
  
According to Kant, the existence of the subject must be presupposed since predicates 
themselves are indeterminate with respect to the existence of their subject.  
This leads Kant to consider the nature of Being. First, he determines that Being is 
identical to ‘positing or setting’, and this may be done either relatively (A is relative to B) 
or absolutely (A is A). In the case of absolute positing ‘what is considered is not merely a 
relation, but the thing posited in and for itself’.
11
 In such a case, Kant continues, ‘being is 
the same as existence.’
12
 There is no relation between A and another predicate B, but 
simply A in relation to itself. In the case of absolute positing, ‘the thing itself, with all 
predicates, is absolutely [ist schlechthin gesetzt].’13 Such absolute positing carries with it 
what Kant calls ‘absolute real necessity [die absolute Realnotwendigkeit]’, and as such it 
is the ‘ultimate foundation [Hauptgrund]’.
14
 This absolute postulation constitutes the ul-
timate ground upon which all relative postulates can be thought. Accordingly, Kant sets 
up the situation whereby a single absolute postulation can be isolated through the removal 
of all predicates. This is Being: ‘Since existence is not a predicate, contingency cannot be 
applied at all to existence’.
15
  
Based upon this reasoning, Kant turns to an a priori consideration of this absolute 
Being, to which he assigns the attributes usually ascribed to God: unique, simple, immu-
table, ‘the supreme reality [die höchste Realität]’,
16
 and a mind. In support of this, Kant 
offers three arguments: First, that will and understanding are ‘true reality [wahre Re-
alität]’ and as such must exist together with absolute reality in one thing. Second, if abso-
lute Being did not possess these properties, then any other being that had them would take 
precedence over absolute Being. Finally, that a mind is necessary to be the principle 
ground of the order, beauty and perfection present in nature.
17
 With this list of characteris-
tics one can see how Kant’s consideration of existence leads back to a consideration of divin-
ity. Kant summarises:  
There exists something absolute necessarily [schlechterdings notwendig]. It is one in 
its essence; it is simple in its substance; it is a mind according to its nature; it is eternal in 
                                                          
10 Kant, 119; II, 72. 
11 Kant, 121; II, 75. 
12 Kant, 119; II, 73.  
13 Kant, 120; II, 74.  
14 Kant, 126-27; II, 82.  
15 Kant, 128; II, 83.  
16 Kant, 128-131; II, 83-87. 
17 Kant, 132; II, 87. 
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its duration; it is immutable in its constitution; and it is all-sufficient in respect of all that 
is possible and real. It is a god. I am not here offering a determinate definition of the con-
cept of God […] But I am certain that the being, whose existence we have just proved, is 
precisely the Divine Being, whose differing characteristics will be reduced, in one way or 
another, to the most concise formula.
18
  
According to Kant, this position, arrived at through pure a priori deliberation, is an 
improvement upon the considerations of God offered by Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. 
He explains that his position does not presuppose the thinker, other minds, or external 
reality. Rather, it has the uncomplicated quality of being ‘an argument derived from the   
internal characteristic mark of absolute necessity.’
19
 Compared to Descartes, he argues 
that it provides a more sound ground than the cogito: ‘I who think am not such an abso-
lutely necessary being, for I am not the ground of all reality and I am subject to change’.
20
 
In comparison to Leibniz, he maintains that it allows for the existence of evil without the 
necessity of having to argue that it is part of the best of all possible worlds. He writes: 
‘the world is not an accident of God, for there are to be found within the world conflict, 
deficiency, changeability, all of which are the opposites of the determinations to be found 
in the divinity’.
21
 Finally, distinguishing his position from Spinoza, he argues that it does 
not reduce all reality into a single monistic substance: ‘God is not the only substance 
which exists; all other substances only exist in dependence upon God.’
22
 
III. Herder’s reception of Kant’s idea of Being. In reflecting upon Kant’s pre-
critical consideration of Being, Herder established an understanding of this key philoso-
phical principle, however his conclusions differentiated him from those of Kant. For  
Herder, divine Being was indeed necessary for existence, as the ground of predication, 
but as such it was also the foundation of all speculative thought concerning reality. As 
such, this transcendent principle occupied a negative relationship to abstract philosophical 
speculation. It was the ground of all reality, and therefore all speculation, but according to 
Herder it could not be an object of speculation itself. Herder’s title and tone throughout in 
the text reflect this. He begins the Versuch by stressing that he does not write for an aca-
demic audience, but rather as an exercise in learning.
23
 In this sense he aims to stress the 
real purpose of a ‘Versuch’, or essayer, as an attempt at a problem or to weigh the facts at 
hand, as opposed to what the professional philosopher does in Herder’s opinion, which is 
to impose an abstract conclusion.  
                                                          
18 Kant, 133, II, 89.  
19 Kant, 135; II, 91. 
20 Kant, 134; II, 90. 
21 Kant, 134; II, 90-91. 
22 Kant, 134; II, 91. For the later development of this argument in Kant’s own thought see Ian Lo-
gan, 'Whatever Happened to Kant’s Ontological Argument?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Rese-
arch (2007) 74.2, 346-63. 
23 Herder, Werke, 9. 
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For Herder, philosophical speculation was inadequate to the complex experiential 
nature of Being. Rather, he explains, Being  as an inarticulable aspect of our experience, 
like ‘a coarse clump [gröbere Klumpen]’.
24
 Herder argues for a correlation between the 
sensate (sinnlich) and inseparable (unzergliederlich); the most sensate concept is Being, 
which is completly inseparability from thought. Whilst all things can be dis-integrated 
from Being, it remains completely inseparable.
25
 Echoing Kant, Herder writes that ‘Being 
is a complete term of experience’ that is impossible to explain since it is the ground of 
predication and the prerequisite of all concepts.
26
 He writes: ‘who can think of a more 
sensate concept, discover  a more simple word, or conceive of a concept that does not rest 
upon its [Being’s] ground.’
27
 Being is the basis of all experience and is utterly invariable, 
constituting the unity of all experience: ‘Thus, Being is:  indivisible  inexplicable  
the centre of all certainty’.
28
  
Despite the fact that it remains indescribable, Herder maintains that Being is some-
thing, and that its impenetrable nature is not due to a problem with language.
29
 In fact, it 
can manifest itself to us in two ways: the existential and the ideal.
30
 The former is experi-
ential, while the latter is a secondary reflection on the first.
31
 Neither the existential nor 
the ideal is explicable without the other, nor can Being be reduced to either. The abstract 
a- priorism of Kant aimed to infer from the ideal to the existential, turning Being into an 
entirely subjective a priori thinking ‘I’. To this Herder retorts that ‘[t]he concept of Being 
is, subjectively speaking, doubtlessly prior to that of possibility, and real possibility is 
prior to the logical one since’, Herder ironically comments, ‘human beings existed before 
philosophers.’
32
 Adopting a different tact than Kant’s approach, Herder explains that  
‘common sense shall be our teacher here: one never attempts to prove a concept of ex-
perience a priori’.33 For Herder, ‘nature robbed the worldly-wise of the burden of proving 
it since it has convinced us: – it [Being] is the centre of all certainty’.
34
 With comments 
such as these, we see Herder developing a skepticism toward philosophical speculation, 
and an intentionally non-philosophical, familiar style, that would remain with him throug-
hout his authorship. According to Herder, Being is ‘the foundation of all our thinking and 
the element with which we are enveloped’.
35
  
Based upon these conclusions, Herder develops a critical posture toward the phi-
                                                          
24 Herder, Werke, I, 20. 
25 Herder, Werke, I, 20. 
26 Herder, Werke, I, 15. 
27 Herder, Werke, I, 12. 
28 Herder, Werke, I, 20. 
29 Herder, Werke, I, 114–15. 
30 Herder, Werke, I, 12. 
31 Herder, Werke, I, 15. 
32 Herder, Werke, I, 15. 
33 Herder, Werke, I, 17. 
34 Herder, Werke, I, 19. 
35 Herder, Werke, I, 14. 
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losophical enterprise, which we find advanced in the opening lines of the Versuch. Adopt-
ing an irreverent tone, he contrasts the method of the philosophers with his own through 
the myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus. These Titans were entrusted by the gods to dis-
tribute qualities to the animals of the earth. Herder likens the method of the philosopher to 
Prometheus (Προµηθεύς, literally fore-thought), wherein theory precedes actuality; and 
his own to that of Epimetheus (Επιµηθεύς, literally after-thought), in which actuality pre-
cedes the theoretical. This allusion is the first record of a conviction that would come to 
structure Herder’s thought in general: that philosophical inquiry must always acknowledge  
that it begins in medias res. This being in the middle of things militates against abstrac-
tion, and a fortiori any attempt to theorise an a priori foundation, and its use as the ground 
for an architectonic. This is the basis of one of Herder’s guiding philosophical principles: 
that meaning is always situational, grounded in Being, but determined in situation and 
time. This makes all philosophical inquiry a process of ceaseless approximation. The 
Promethean, and its foregrounding nature, can be identified with Kant’s attempt to arrive 
at an a priori proof for the necessity of Being and hence the existence of God apart from 
experience.
36
 Yet for Herder, Being manifested itself in one’s own participation in Being. 
Consequently, Being could only ever be encountered as Epimetheus encountered it, as 
already conditioned.  
The Versuch offers the first articulation of Herder’s empirically orientated, experien-
tial philosophy. Yet despite his objection to a priori speculation, he does not merely adopt 
an opposing empirical perspective. Rather, he explains that whilst he identifies with the 
positions of both Aristotle and John Locke in holding that our concepts come from ex-
perience, he also asks ‘whether our concepts cannot be other than sensual, whether there 
is no other way to our inner sense, than through the loopholes of the external concepts’.
37
 
The fact that human beings, unlike other animals, are conscious of their thinking, returns 
one to the premise of Cartesian idealism: that there is an a priori something that allows 
the self to say to itself ‘I’.
38
 At the same time, Herder recognises that this ‘I’ cannot be 
experienced without conditioned experience. Only in the case of God is it possible to say 
‘I think through myself, and everything else through me’, whereas human beings, Herder 
explains, are like children who are born into the task of getting to know themselves.
39
 In 
other words, God is able to think the ‘I’ a priori since God is Being, the ground of reality. 
Human beings, on the other hand, may only know the ‘I’ through a reflective relationship 
that experiences Being. In this light, Kant’s position, and that of abstract thought in gen-
eral, pretends at a godlike position that attempts to escape the necessarily experiential 
aspect of Being.  
Consequently, there is a fundamental distinction in the understanding of the divine 
offered in the positions of Kant and Herder. Kant’s a priori argument, based on Being as 
                                                          
36 Herder, Werke, I, 9. 
37 Herder, Werke, I, 10. 
38 Herder, Werke, I, 11. 
39 Herder, Werke, I, 11.  
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the ground of predication, led him to an extra-mundane conceptualisation of the divinity. 
Accordingly, God was defined by the same collection of superlative attributes that made 
up the ontological argument. The result is that under Kant’s position God stands at an 
infinite ontological distance from human finitude. The opposite was the case with 
Herder’s articulation of God as Being. Consequently, God is not a distant abstraction, but 
immediately present. As he argued, all reality participates in the Being that is both its 
foundation, and in which all reality is ‘enveloped’. Kant and Herder in effect, arrive at 
opposing positions as a result of their diverging a priori and a posteriori approaches to 
the question of Being. Kant’s critique of the ontological argument led in part to his gen-
eral critique of metaphysics, and the development of a transcendental philosophy, wherein 
the ordering principles of cognition were rational and a priori.40 For Kant, the Absolute at 
the centre of religion was the moral law that had its source in a transcendent realm, se-
cured by the postulates of pure practical reason: God, freedom, and immortality. Alter-
nately, for Herder, the fact that Being was a matter of experience led to a critique of ab-
stract philosophical speculation, a historicist outlook, and the development of an empiri-
cist naturalism. As a result, we find that in Herder’s thoguht the Absolute of religion, 
whilst transcendent in itself, is known through its immanent manifestations, in the phe-
nomena of science, the course history, the development of language and in the evolution 
of religion.  
IV. The subsequent role of Being in Herder’s thought. From his early reading of 
Kant, Herder adopted the principle that Being was the transcendent ground of predication, 
and the insight that it could only be experienced as such. Furthermore, he concluded that 
Being was best understood not through speculative thought upon its transcendent nature, 
but through a process of the ceaseless interpretation of all immanent reality through which 
Being discloses itself. Abstract philosophical speculation, the attempt to arrive at an Ar-
chimedean point in relation to reality, was a fruitless effort, and only obscured our en-
counter with Being through philosophical fictions that pretended at a God-like position.  
This is why we see Herder in his subsequent work developing a form of empiricist natu-
ralism and historicism, which focuses upon immanent reality as that which discloses tran-
scendent Being. Herder, like Kant, has no difficulty granting Being divinity, and his 
thought is thoroughly theistic. However, his God is not the traditional God of philosophy, 
a collection of superlative attributes at an infinite distance from creation. Rather all reality 
takes on the quality of disclosing the divine. Herder develops this position throughout his 
work, particularly in his understanding of science, language, history and religion. 
We find Herder developing his idea of divine disclosure in relation to natural science 
in his dialogue Gott. Einige Gespräche (1787). In this work, Herder writes: ‘The whole 
world is an expression, an appearance of his [God’s] eternally-living, eternal-active forc-
es’.
41
 He elaborates this position, explaining that the deity is revealed as the underlying 
                                                          
40 Kant, 72–76; IV, 275-280. 
41 Johann Gottfried Herder, God, Some Conversations, trans. by Frederick Burkhardt (New York: 
Veritas Press, 1940), p. 150; Sämmtliche Werke, XVI, 517. 
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unity of the organic forces in nature.
42
 Herder observes this to be the case in the most 
recent advances within the sciences, where forces such as magnetism and electricity have 
been proven to be present in bodies and in the atmosphere.
43
 According to Herder, scien-
tific examination, as opposed to abstract rational speculation, discloses the divine. The 
task of philosophy is to make the scientist aware of this: 
All these deceptions [of abstract speculation] in which God's name is misused, are 
avoided by the sober natural scientist who, indeed, does not inform us about particular 
decisions from the chamber of divine council, but instead, examines the condition of 
things themselves and notes the essential laws implanted in them. While seeming to forget 
the divine purposes, he [the scientist] seeks and finds in every object and point of crea-
tion, God complete.
44
 
This kind of theism, revealed in immanent nature, Herder explains elsewhere in the 
text, replaces the phantom God of reason, that is everywhere comprehensible as the ‘is’ 
that exists between the subject and predicate.
45
 
We find the same disclosure of being articulated in relation to the origins of lan-
guage in Herder’s Über die Ursprung der Sprache (1772). This was his contribution to 
the debate on the origins of language for which he was awarded a prize from the Berlin 
Academy. Rejecting the divine source theory of language, he instead maintained that 
language was not by divine intervention, but developed through a reflective rational proc-
ess bound to history and place. Language still had a divine origin of sorts, however, this 
was as a latent natural capacity placed in the human species by God for humans to de-
velop themselves. Herder further developed the ideas he expressed in his essay on lan-
guage into the historicised providence that we find in Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774), and elaborated more fully in Herder’s 
Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784 – 91). The first volume of 
this work explains the development of human history according to natural laws. For 
Herder, ‘History is purely a natural history of human forces, actions and instincts in ac-
cordance with their place and time’.
46
 Consequently, the study of these forces brings us to 
a greater understanding of Being, allowing individuals to master their passions and imi-
tate the divinely instituted order through their reason.
47
   
Finally, when it comes the religious reflection, Herder argues in much the same way 
as he does with natural science and history. The divine presents itself to each age accor-
ding to its historical and temporal necessities. In Über die neuere Deutsche Lieteratur, in 
a section entitled ‘Vom neuern Gebrauch der Mythologie’ (1766 – 1767), Herder makes 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 104, 140; XVI, 452, 496. 
43 Ibid. 105; XVI, 453-454.  
44 Ibid. 131; XVI, 491. 
45 Ibid. 150; XVI, 517. 
46 Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, XIV, 145. 
47 Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, XIII, 171. 
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the point that it was considered appropriate to make changes and additions to mythology 
so that it might adapt in order to be ‘individual in its character, national in its country, 
patriotic in its hero, appropriate in its events, realistic in its time, and idiomatic in its lan-
guage’.
48
 This idea operates behind Herder’s six collections of Zerstreute Blätter (1784 – 
1797) which contain an interconnected mixture of poetry and prose, concerning themes 
central to spirituality from Greek, Roman, Persian, Indian, Scandinavian, and ancient 
German sources.  
Herder’s writing has always presented particular difficulties. He aimed to avoid the 
language of philosophical abstraction, writing in a style he developed in the context of the 
Strum und Drang movement. His publications are earthy, rough, dialogical, irreverent, 
and contain many allusions that can impede accessibility for the contemporary reader. 
Despite this, there is much in the writing of Herder for philosophers to take account of. 
Each of these examples, illustrating his thought on science, history, language, and relig-
ion, reflect Herder’s wide ranging authorship, and illustrate the important central influ-
ence of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument, and his assertion that Being is the 
ground of predication. Recognising the central role of this principle, elaborated in the 
early Versuch text, allows us to gain an understanding of a central organising philosophi-
cal principle within Herder’s authorship. It also, further to this, makes it possible to ap-
preciate the reasoning behind his style. The fact that Herder believed our encounter with 
Being was always contextual, meant that he refused to engage in any systematisation of 
his philosophical position, which gave the illusion of completion. This is reflected in the 
grammar of his writing as well. He believed this allowed his work to present Being as it 
was manifested in the particular instances in which it is encountered. This anti-systematic, 
often fragmentary style established a tradition that we may trace through subsequent phi-
losophy, for example in the work of the Romantics Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, and 
later in the writing of Nietzsche and even Wittgenstein.  
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